University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 37
Number 2 Spring 2007

Article 5

2007

Recent Developments: J.P. Delphey Ltd. P'Ship v.
Mayor & City of Frederick: Due to an Exception in
the Open Meetings Act, Municipal Governments
with Legislative Powers Can Vote to Condemn
Property in a Closed Executive Session without
Enacting a Property-Specific Ordinance
Kristy Haller

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Haller, Kristy (2007) "Recent Developments: J.P. Delphey Ltd. P'Ship v. Mayor & City of Frederick: Due to an Exception in the Open
Meetings Act, Municipal Governments with Legislative Powers Can Vote to Condemn Property in a Closed Executive Session without
Enacting a Property-Specific Ordinance," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 37 : No. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol37/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT
J.P. DELPHEY LTD. P'SHIP V. MAYOR & CITY OF
FREDERICK: DUE TO AN EXCEPTION IN THE OPEN
MEETINGS ACT, MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS WITH
LEGISLATIVE POWERS CAN VOTE TO CONDEMN
PROPERTY IN A CLOSED EXECUTIVE SESSION WITHOUT
ENACTING A PROPERTY-SPECIFIC ORDINANCE.
By: Kristy Haller
Under an exception found in section 10-508(a)(3) of the Open
Meetings Act, legislative bodies may vote to condemn property in
closed sessions without violating section 8 of Article 23A of the
Maryland Code, which normally prohibits the adoption of resolutions
in closed sessions. J.P. Delphey Ltd. P'ship v. Mayor & City of
Frederick, 369 Md. 180, 913 A.2d 28 (2006). The Court of Appeals of
Maryland found that there is no need for a legislative act or ordinance
specific to the condemned property, provided that the vote for
condemnation is conducted by a legislative body and not an executive
body. [d.
In 2000, the City of Frederick, Maryland ("the City") began the
process of acquiring land to be used for a fourth parking garage
located within city limits. Since 1997, the City had allocated funds in
its budget for the garage construction. After studies were undertaken
in 1989 and 1999, the City concluded that the property owned by J.P.
Delphey Limited Partnership ("Delphey") presented the best location
in terms of impact on the downtown area. An offer of $1,200,000, the
appraised value of the property, was extended to Delphey, who in tum
made a counter-offer for $3,000,000.
In subsequent public meetings, Task Force recommendations on the
Delphey property were adopted and a finance agreement for the
construction of the garage was approved. Following a reappraisal of
the property, the City offered Delphey $1,675,000, plus additional
incentives. Delphey rejected this offer as well.
On November 5,2002, the Mayor released a media advisory stating
that following the public meeting to be held the next day, a closed
meeting between the Mayor and the Board of Aldermen ("the Board")
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would be held to discuss the acquisition of the Delphey property.
Minutes from the session revealed discussions regarding how the
condemnation process would work and if alternative payment methods
to Delphey could be arranged. In the end, the Board unanimously
voted to begin condemnation proceedings against Delphey's property.
The City began condemnation proceedings in the Circuit Court for
Frederick County, which held that the City was entitled to condemn
the property. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland upheld the trial court's decision, finding no legislative
requirement that a property-specific ordinance be enacted before
condemnation would be possible. The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland also found that the condemnation was an executive action
and therefore required no specific ordinance. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals of Maryland, the Court considered (1) whether the City of
Frederick was required to enact a specific ordinance in order to
condemn the property, (2) as a matter of first impression, whether the
City violated section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code when
they voted for condemnation in a closed session, and (3) whether the
City violated section 1O-508(a)(3) of the Open Meetings Act ("Open
Meetings Act") when they voted for condemnation in a closed session.
On the issue of whether an ordinance specific to the property was
required for condemnation, the Court found in favor of the City.
Delphey, 396 Md. at 195, 913 A.2d at 37. Both section 8 of Article
23A of the Maryland Code and section 173 of Article 14 of the City's
charter allow the Board to condemn properties. Delphey, 396 Md. at
192-93, 913 A.2d at 35. Although the vote to condemn Delphey's
property was conducted in a closed executive session, the Board was
acting in a legislative capacity, thus falling under the provision of
section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code, which lists
condemnation as an express ordinance-making power of municipal
legislative bodies. Delphey, 396 Md. at 191-93, 913 A.2d at 35-36.
Referring to past decisions, the Court noted that property-specific
ordinances are not always required. [d. at 195,913 A.2d at 37. In past
cases, prior annual budget approvals concerning the property being
condemned were enough to show '''proper legislative authorization. '"
[d. (quoting Boswell v. Prince George's County, 273 Md. at 522,533,
330 A.2d 663, 670 (1975». In Delphey's case, the City had taken
several authorized actions, including allotting funds for the garage
since 1997 and conducting appraisals concerning the property.
Delphey, 396 Md. at 195-96, 913 A.2d at 37. Sufficient legislative
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authority was already in place and precludes the need for an ordinance
specific to Delphey's property. [d.
In discussing whether the vote to condemn Delphey's property

during a closed executive session violated the Open Meetings Act and
section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code, the Court also decided
in favor of the City. Delphey, 396 Md. at 202, 913 A.2d at 41. The
Court recognized that an exception in the Open Meetings Act and
section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code are in direct conflict
because section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code is very broad
and prohibits the adoption of "any rule, regulation, resolution or
ordinance during a closed executive session," while the Open
Meetings Act calls for "public business to be performed in an open
and public manner," but allows for closed sessions to "consider the
acquisition of real property for a public purpose and matters directly
related thereto." !d. at 197-98,913 A.2d at 38-39 (quoting MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T. § 10-501 (1984 repl. vol. 1995)). Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the narrow Open Meetings Act exception
overrides section 8 of Article 23A of the Maryland Code, thus
legitimizing the City's actions. Delphey, 396 Md. at 197-200, 913
A.2d at 38-40.
In its analysis, the Court underscored the importance of public
policy when interpreting the Open Meetings Act and referred to two
previous decisions where the activities of the legislative bodies in
question violated the Open Meetings Act. [d. at 200-01, 913 A.2d at
40. In CLUB v. Baltimore Board of Elections, the Court found that the
Baltimore City Council's failure to give proper public notice
concerning meetings, where the drafting of a bill was under
discussion, violated the Open Meetings Act. Delphey, 396 Md. at
200-01, 913 A.2d at 40 (citing CLUB, 377 Md. 183, 832 A.2d 804
(2003)). While in Baltimore Development Corporation v. Carmel
Realty Associates, the Court held that the corporation performed many
of the functions reserved for the Mayor and City Council and therefore
operated as a "public body," requiring compliance with the Open
Meetings Act, which the corporation had failed to do. Delphey, 396
Md. at 200-01,913 A.2d at 40 (citing Baltimore Dev. Corp. v. Carmel
Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299,910 A.2d 406 (2006)).
In contrast to the activities taking place in CLUB and Carmel
Realty, the Court highlighted the public campaign by the City of
Frederick to acquire Delphey's property, including mention of the
possibility of acquiring or condemning the property in two previous
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public meetings, and adds that "no such evasive devices" as seen in
CLUB and Carmel Realty are evident in Delphey. Delphey, 396 Md.
201, 913 A.2d at 40. Thus, even under a policy argument, the Court
found that the City took the appropriate steps in condemning the
Delphey property. Id.
In an era of rapid development and urbanization, extra care must be
taken to safeguard both the fundamental right of property ownership
and the public's right to have a voice in how its government functions.
The Court's decision opens the door a little wider for municipal
governments, making the process to condemn property even easier by
no longer requiring public oversight at key stages of the process.

